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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty
under inflation targeting and a conventional fixed exchange rate system and
the impact of each regime on inflation and inflation uncertainty over the span
from 1980:01 to 2014:06. The results from GARCH in mean models reveal
that, under the two monetary regimes, inflation increases inflation uncer-
tainty and inflation uncertainty raises inflation. This positive bi-directional
relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty provides evidence of
the importance of non-discretionary monetary policies. Both regimes appear
effective in reducing inflation uncertainty in the long-run which suggests the
importance of monetary regimes as signalling devices for inflation expecta-
tions. The fixed exchange rate regime has no impact on average inflation
and inflation inertia, while inflation targeting has been successful at lowering
average inflation and inflation persistence of its adopters. Nevertheless, the
results provide evidence that inflation targeting countries have not benefited
equally from this monetary regime.
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1 Introduction
Over the last century, monetary regimes that anchor the exchange rate have failed
to ensure the goal of price stability. Indeed, the success and the prolonged use of ex-
change rate to fix prices have been questioned after the failure of past fixed exchange
rate systems. As a consequence, many countries have moved to adopt different forms
of Inflation Targeting (IT).Nonetheless, there is a consensus among economists that
the social and financial costs attributed to inflation are due mainly to uncertainty
about future inflation. In fact, the links between inflation and inflation uncertainty
have gained attention in the literature after the Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977);
he argues that inflation causes higher inflation uncertainty. The positive relation-
ship between the two variables is theoretically justified by Ball (1992), who shows
that weak policy makers are more likely to permit inflation during high-inflation
episodes, generating more inflation uncertainty. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), on
the other hand, reveal that inflation uncertainty leads to higher inflation. However,
it is also argued that the causality from inflation uncertainty to inflation might turn
negative. In this sense, Holland (1995) states that central banks could respond to in-
flation uncertainty through lowering the money stock, and thereby, a negative nexus
might appear as a sign of stabilising reaction of monetary policy. Consequently, over
the last three decades, questioning the relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty has encouraged a large number of empirical studies, which attempted
to assess the validity of Friedman-Ball (F-B) and Cukierman and Meltzer (C-M)
hypotheses. Following the development of the Auto Regressive Conditional Het-
eroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalised ARCH (GARCH), by Engle (1982) and
Bollerslev (1986), respectively, more studies have been conducted to examine the
links between inflation and inflation uncertainty. However, while there has been a
considerable number of studies on the relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty, there have been a few studies, e.g., Chang and He (2010), Kontonikas
(2004), Caporale et al. (2012), that have considered the role of monetary regimes
on the nexus, but the attention has been given to IT and the euro regime. In ad-
dition, to the best of our knowledge, no study, other than Khan et al. (2013), has
attempted to compare between two quantitatively-based monetary regimes. Khan
et al. (2013) studied the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty for
Eastern European countries which have a currency board or are inflation targeters.
However, they fail to address distinctions between the two regimes, and thus, to
specify which regime works better at reducing the nominal and real inflation un-
certainty. Furthermore, far too little attention has been paid to the cases with soft
fixed exchange rates. Even when some cases were considered in the studies, e.g.,
Daal et al. (2005) and Samimi et al. (2012), researchers have not investigated the
relationship between inflation and uncertainty in much detail, i.e., the impact of
monetary regimes on the nexus has been ignored.
Hence, with a similar comparison objective of Khan et al. (2013), this paper
attempts to fill a gap in the empirical literature by investigating the nexus between
inflation and inflation uncertainty in emerging market economies under two mon-
etary anchors: a fixed exchange rate (FER) regime to the US dollar and inflation
targeting. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we test the F-B and C-M
hypotheses under the two regimes. Secondly, we evaluate the plausible effects of
adopting a specific quantitative target on inflation uncertainty.
Different GARCH in Mean (GARCH-M) models are constructed to investigate
the relationship in two countries with fixed exchange rate to the US dollar (FER);
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Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeters: South Africa, Brazil and Poland.1
We select inflation targeters, from three different continents, that had experienced
an economic and/or political challenge before shifting to inflation targeting. The
exchange rate targeting countries represent cases which also experienced a shift in
monetary regime during the study period and suffered from political and economic
pressures, criteria which do not apply to most exchange rate peggers, e.g., Gulf
States. This selection allows us to highlight how the economies of the examined
countries have benefited from the regime under investigation. The paper compares
implicitly between the impact of monetary policy independence on inflation and in-
flation uncertainty, where inflation targeting enjoys more monetary policy flexibility
compared to the soft pegged exchange rate system.
The plan of this paper is as follows; section two provides the literature review.
Section three discusses the methodology applied. Section four presents the data.
The results and concluding remarks are provided in section five and six, respectively.
2 Literature Review
Some policy makers and economists suggest that the costs of a predicted low and
moderate inflation rate are acceptable and supported by economic theory. However,
Okun (1971) shows that an anticipated rate of steady inflation as implied by acceler-
ationists would be ideal to wind down the social and redistributive costs of inflation.
However, such steady inflation is difficult to achieve due to inflation expectations,
which hinge substantially upon the type of government in power and the trade-off
between employment and inflation. Consequently, he points out that the acceptance
of moderate and steady inflation would trigger higher inflation expectations, which
eventually leads to a higher inflation rate. He hypothesises, by analysing the infla-
tion behaviour for different OECD countries, that high inflation may lead to higher
inflation variability, and that high inflation countries experienced higher inflation
variability. Nevertheless, the link between inflation and its uncertainty has gained
much interest after the Nobel lecture of Friedman (1977). Friedman states that the
relationship between unemployment and nominal wage changes is not stable owning
to inflation uncertainty, which increases with the level of inflation.2 Ball (1992)
supports the hypothesis suggested by Friedman that high inflation leads to higher
inflation uncertainty. He bases his argument on a monetary policy-time inconsis-
tency model of Barro and Gordon (1983), where market agents are uncertain about
the type of government in power. On the other hand, on the basis of the same
time inconsistency model, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that, as central
bankers are motivated to create surprise inflation to stimulate economic activity, an
increase in inflation variability raises the level of inflation rate.3 In other words,
for Friedman and Ball, higher inflation creates higher inflation uncertainty, while
1 Note that Egypt has opted out from the fixed exchange rate system, so the study compares
between the time during the fixed system and after abandoning it.
2He further argues that inflation-inflation uncertainty leads to lower output growth; however,
this impact is unsettled in the literature and depends on whether money is considered neutral;
see e.g., Tobin (1965), Sidrauski (1967), Stockman (1981). However, the most recent studies have
shown that the link exists in practice, but the effect of inflation on economic growth comes through
inflation uncertainty, see Chang and He (2010), Grier et al. (2004). Fountas (2010), on the other
hand, finds that output growth is not affected by inflation uncertainty.
3Policy makers may increase an optimal inflation rate to benefit from low unemployment, see
Tobin (1972), or to lower the public debt, see Fischer and Summers (1989) for further detail.
3
for Cukieman-Meltzer, the causality goes in the other direction, that is, inflation
uncertainty increases inflation.
Therefore, a large number of empirical works has attempted to examine the nexus
between inflation and inflation uncertainty using different measures of inflation un-
certainty, finding inconclusive results. See Glezakos and Nugent (1984), Pourgerami
and Maskus (1987) and Cukierman and Wachtel (Cukierman and Wachtel) amongst
many others.
Although the survey-based measures were believed to be good proxies for in-
flation uncertainty, such measures were unable to distinguish between transitory
and permanent shocks to inflation, where the latter have a much stronger effects
on the intertemporal decision making of individuals and businesses. Thus, Ball
et al. (1990) claim that the effect of control errors lasts temporarily and decays
over short periods, whereas inflation has a severe effect on uncertainty at longer
horizons, where permanent shocks dominate. Engle (1982) was the first to measure
inflation uncertainty as the conditional variance of inflation to study the relationship
between inflation and uncertainty in the United States. In fact, the introduction of
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasicity (ARCH) and General Autoregressive
Conditional Heteroscedasicity (GARCH) approaches by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev
(1986), respectively, encourages a large number of recent empirical work examining
the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Evans (1991) constructs a model which allows for the changes in the structure
of inflation to affect inflation uncertainty. This is performed by incorporating the
different aspects of inflation uncertainty through the Kalman filter: the conditional
variance of inflation, the conditional variance of expected inflation and the condi-
tional variance of steady-state inflation. He applies the model to the US during
the period 1960:01-1988:06 and concludes that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Grier and Perry (1998) examine the relationship utilising a GARCH model to pro-
duce a proxy for inflation uncertainty in the G7 countries. Their findings from the
Granger causality tests suggest that the nexus is positive as implied by F-B, but little
evidence is found in favour of the C-M hypothesis. Fountas (2001) and Kontonikas
(2004), who apply GARCH and GARCH-M, respectively, find evidence that the F-B
hypothesis, for different examined periods, hold true for the UK. In fact, most stud-
ies have used either GARCH or GARCH-M to investigate the relationship between
inflation and uncertainty in different countries, reporting mixed results concerning
the causality between inflation and uncertainty; whether it goes from inflation to
uncertainty or the opposite; others even find the link to be bi-directional. Conrad
and Karanasos (2005) find evidence for the Friedman hypothesis in the US and the
UK, while the results for Japan show that uncertainty affected the level of inflation
as suggested by C-M.
Most of the studies on the link between inflation-inflation uncertainty, e.g., Daal
et al. (2005), Grier and Grier (2006), Hwang (2001), Thornton (2007), Payne (2008),
Keskek and Orhan (2010), Jiranyakul and Opiela (2011), Hartmann and Herwartz
(2012), Fountas and Karanasos (2007), support the Friedman hypothesis. Similarly,
Grier and Grier (2006), who apply an augmented multivariate GARCH-M to study
the nexus in Mexico, find that high inflation increases inflation uncertainty. Nev-
ertheless, Hwang (2001) finds, using an ARFIMA-GARCH model, no causal nexus
between inflation and its uncertainty in the United States over the period 1926-1992.
One drawback of GARCH models is that it is unable by construction to capture
the asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks to inflation. Hence a new
family of asymmetric GARCH has evolved to consider the fact that bad news in
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financial markets has deeper effects than good news (Grier and Perry, 1998). Sub-
sequently, many studies have constructed different models of asymmetric GARCH,
such as Jiranyakul and Opiela (2010), Nazar et al. (2010) and Rizvi and Naqvi
(2009) amongst others. In fact, the adoption of inflation targeting across many de-
veloped and developing central banks has increased the willingness to discover the
benefit of the new framework. Fountas (2001) suggests that the announcement of an
explicit inflation target has a prominent effect on lowering inflation persistence and
uncertainty at long horizon. Kim (1993) also supports the Friedman hypothesis for
the United States as the nexus is found to be positively correlated during high infla-
tion periods. Likewise, Tas and Ertugrul (2013) find that the relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty is positive and inflation variance has decreased
after IT in most inflation targeters investigated in his study. Similar findings were
obtained by Kontonikas (2004) for the UK. Bhar and Mallik (2013) also point out
that IT is an optimal anchor for the UK, however, they find that the relationship
between inflation and uncertainty has turned to be negative after inflation targeting.
Furthermore, Bhar and Mallik (2012) and Bhar and Mallik (2013) claim that adopt-
ing IT in New Zealand and Australia grants monetary authorities more flexibility
in setting the nominal interest rates.4 Other studies such as Neanidis and Savva
(2011), Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), Caporale et al. (2012), show that adopt-
ing the euro played a major positive role in affecting the nexus between inflation
and uncertainty. The only study which compared between two different monetary
regimes; currency boards and inflation targeting, for Eastern European countries, is
Khan et al. (2013), who apply EGARCH model and find support for the Friedman
hypothesis. However, the study fails to underline which monetary anchor worked
better at reducing inflation uncertainty.
The current paper examines the relationship between inflation and inflation un-
certainty in inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting countries and highlights
the role of each monetary anchor in reducing the inflation uncertainty. In partic-
ular, the paper attempts to underline the impact of monetary policy flexibility on
inflation and inflation uncertainty using GARCH models. Hence, it adds to the
growing body of literature on the importance of inflation targeting as a framework
for monetary policy.
3 Methodology
GARCH-type models have been widely employed to investigate the relationship be-
tween inflation and inflation uncertainty, as they provide a time-varying measure
for volatility.Nevertheless, a standard GARCH model does not allow examining the
effect of inflation and inflation uncertainty simultaneously. Hence, the previous sta-
tistical technique to study the direction of the nexus, conducted by some studies,
was a two stage approach, under which the conditional variance of inflation is esti-
mated in the first stage, then the Granger causality tests are performed to determine
4See also Mallik and Bhar (2011) on the relationship between inflation uncertainty and interest
rates for five inflation targeters, and Wright (2011) for the effect of inflation targeting on interest
rates.
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the causal direction of the relationship.5
However, GARCH-M, developed by Engle et al. (1987), permits inflation to be
specified by inflation uncertainty. Therefore, to investigate the relationship simul-
taneously, we allow the conditional variance of inflation to be influenced by the
mean, and the inflation rate to be determined by the conditional variance. These
specifications can be represented as follows:
The mean equation:6
pit = α0 +
p∑
t=1
αipit−i +
q∑
j=1
βjεt−j + δ
√
ht + εt (1)
The variance equation:7
pit = φ+
p∑
t=1
αiε
2
t−1 +
q∑
j=1
βjht−j + λZt−1 (2)
Where pit−i is the lagged inflation rate; εt−j is the lagged errors and εt is the
error term, which has conditional and unconditional mean of zero and conditional
variance, ht, given by equation (2). The conditional variance is determined by the
lagged squared residuals, the lagged conditional variance and Zt−1, which includes
only lags of inflation. Stationarity restrictions of the model entail that αi and βj,
the non-negative parameters, must be less that unity. If the sum of the parameters
is equal to one, the conditional variance must be modelled by Integrated GARCH
(Harvey, 2013).
If δ in the mean equation is significantly positive, higher inflation uncertainty
generates higher inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, when the coeffi-
cient is significantly negative, the Holland hypothesis of monetary policy stabilising
effect holds true. λ in equation (2) determines the effect of inflation on inflation
uncertainty. Obtaining a positive and significant coefficient indicates that inflation
uncertainty increases with inflation, as suggested by F-B.
Nevertheless, the conditional variance of inflation estimated by GARCH-M is
formed to consider only the magnitude of inflation shocks, ε2t−1, and thereby the
sign of innovations is ignored by the model construction. Hence, to account for pos-
sible asymmetric responses to positive and negative inflation shocks, an asymmetric
GARCH model, i.e., Exponential GARCH, is used.
The conditional variance in the EGARCH model, put forward by Nelson (1991),
is set in an logarithmic form, which does not require imposing artificially non-
5See Nas and Perry (2000) and Grier and Perry (1998). Fountas (2010) incorporates ’in mean
coefficients’ to capture the effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation. When the effect is found, for
some countries, insignificant, he estimates the standard GARCH model, and from the estimated
conditional variance he performs Granger causality tests. In the mean equation, he includes lags of
inflation uncertainty to consider the inertia of money supply in responding to inflation. The influ-
ence of money supply was suggested by Holland (1995), who argues that central banks will respond
to inflation uncertainty by reducing money supply and, consequently, decreasing the inflation rate.
6In our study, as explained in details in the results section, the mean equation is built on AR
specifications rather than ARMA process, so the lagged error terms are excluded.
7GARCH model estimates a time-varying variance of residuals which acts as a proxy for un-
expected inflation volatility (Daal et al., 2005). The GARCH regression model is built on an
autoregressive moving average of a known variable, where the conditional variance is a linear func-
tion of its past values and past squared shocks. This model has an ARMA construction which
makes the model soluble; however, given its quadratic specification, the model equalises the effect
of positive and negative innovations (Zakoian, 1994). Inserting a one-period lagged inflation in the
variance equation allows examining the hypothesis of Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992).
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negativity constraints on the parameters to ensure a positive variance. The model
representation can be seen as follows:
log h2t = ϕ+ β1[|
εt−1
ht−1
|] + β2[ εt−1
ht−1
] + β3 log h
2
t−1 + λZt−1 (3)
In this case, an asymmetric response to inflation shocks exists if β2 6=0. A sig-
nificantly positive β2 implies that the inflation uncertainty increases more when the
economy is hit by a positive shock, i.e., εt−1>0, than a negative inflation shock, i.e.,
εt−1<0 (Wilson, 2006).
Nevertheless, as policy makers are more concerned about the long-run impact
of inflation uncertainty, and more importantly the impact of monetary anchor on
reducing inflation uncertainty in the long-run, we utilise the Component GARCH
(CGARCH), developed by Lee and Engle (1993). This model separates the long-
run from short-run components of inflation uncertainty by allowing the mean of the
conditional variance to vary around a time varying level, ϕ.
ht = ϕt + α1(e
2
t−1 − ϕt−1) + β1(ht−1 + ϕt−1) (4)
ht = ϕ+ ρϕt−1 + µ(e2t−1 − ht−1) + λZt−1 (5)
Equation (4) represents the transitory component, which approaches zero with
the power of α1+ β1. ρ in the long run component, shown in equation (5), is usually
close to one, as the time varying trend converges to the mean very slowly. If,
1>ρ>α1+β1, the short run component of inflation uncertainty will die out rapidly
more than the trend. This indicates that the forecasts of the conditional variance
will depend essentially upon the trend (Kontonikas, 2004).
4 Data
Monthly data on Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period from 1980:01 to 2014:06
are extracted from the International Financial Statistics of the International Mon-
etary Fund for the two FER countries: Jordan and Egypt, and the three inflation
targeters: South Africa, Brazil and Poland. The monetary regime shift experienced
by all the countries allows to spot the benefits of the examined regime in terms of
inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Inflation is computed as pit = log cpit - log cpit−1. The inflation series is then
adjusted to remove the seasonality by executing the Census Bureaus X12 in an ad-
ditive default mode. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the inflation series
properties for each respective country. The statistics of the average inflation, dis-
played in Table 1-Panel(a), reveal that inflation targeting countries have experienced
a marked lower average inflation after shifting to IT. However, this direct effect of
the monetary anchor on inflation process is not obvious for the two fixed exchange
rate targeters.8
The statistics, reported in Table 1-Panel(b), indicate that the distribution of
inflation is heavy-tailed. For all the countries, the distribution is positively skewed
and leptokurtic, and inflation series failed to satisfy Jarque and Bera (1980) test
for normality. This asymmetry and peakness of the distribution are considered
in modelling the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty by using
8This cannot be attributed to the recent economic and political disturbances in the Middle East
region. The two countries have been reeling from unstable political and social conditions for the
full period of the study.
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a generalised error distribution with normalised density of zero mean and unity
variance, in which the normal distribution is a special case (Nelson, 1991).
The seasonally adjusted inflation series for each country exhibits stationary pro-
cess, as shown in Table 2. According to Dickey and Fuller (1979) (ADF) and Phillips
and Perron (1988) (PP) tests, with and without a trend, the null hypothesis that
inflation contains a unit root is rejected at a high level of significance.
Breusch and Godfrey test for serial correlation is first executed to ensure the
whiteness of residuals before testing for ARCH effect. The results, presented in
Table 1-Panel(b), imply that the inflation series’ residuals are serially independent
and conditionally heteroskedastic. A constant and slope regime dummy variable are
imposed in the mean equation to account for the shift in monetary regime. We also
account for the effect of certain political events in some countries on inflation and
inflation uncertainty like Arab Spring in Jordan and Egypt and Apartheid in South
Africa.
5 Results
The conditional mean of inflation is specified by constructing several ARMA mod-
els. Given that inflation is seasonally adjusted, it is found that including only the
autoregressive terms yields the best model specifications, which is the common case
in modelling inflation in the empirical literature (Kontonikas, 2004). For each coun-
try, we begin by incorporating up to twelve AR specifications to allow capturing the
persistence of the data. The length of AR components is shortened on the basis of
Akaike and Schwartz information criteria and by ensuring that all autocorrelation
coefficients up to twelve lags fall inside the non-rejection region, which is also con-
firmed by the Q-statistics of Box and Pierce (1970). Accordingly, the selected AR
process forms the following benchmark-mean specifications:
Jordan:
pit = γ
JO
0 + γ
JO
1 pit−2 + γ
JO
2 pit−5 + γ
JO
3 pit−9 + γ
JO
4 pit−12 + ut (6)
Egypt:
pit = γ
EG
0 + γ
EG
1 pit−1 + γ
EG
2 pit−9 + γ
EG
3 pit−12 + ut (7)
South Africa:
pit = γ
SA
0 + γ
SA
1 pit−1 + γ
SA
2 pit−2 + γ
SA
3 pit−3 + γ
SA
4 pit−7
+γSA5 pit−8 + γ
SA
6 pit−11 + γ
SA
7 pit−12 + ut
(8)
Brazil:
pit = γ
BR
0 + γ
BR
1 pit−1 + γ
BR
2 pit−2 + γ
BR
3 pit−8 + ut (9)
Poland:
pit = γ
PO
0 + γ
PO
1 pit−1 + γ
PO
2 pit−2 + γ
PO
3 pit−5 + γ
PO
4 pit−9 + γ
PO
5 pit−11 + ut (10)
For each country, we split the inflation series between the time before and after
adopting the monetary regime of interest. The preliminary evidence from the OLS
regression of the benchmark models, shown in Tables 3 to 7, suggests that IT has
been successful at reducing the volatility of inflation as ARCH effect turned insignifi-
cant after adopting IT. Interestingly, for Egypt, inflation volatility has become lower
not during the fixed exchange rate system but after opting out, while for Jordan,
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the impact of the exchange rate targeting is unclear as the volatility for the period
after exchange rate targeting is found at high lags.
For our motivation to examine the simultaneous relationship between inflation
and inflation uncertainty, we incorporate the standard deviation in the mean equa-
tion as a volatility measure and augment the variance equation with lagged infla-
tion.9 Furthermore, to model the impact of monetary regime on inflation dynamics,
slope dummies are plugged in the conditional mean equations, in which the dummy
takes the value of one when the examined monetary regime is in effect, and zero oth-
erwise. We first attempt to introduce the regime slope dummies via different lags,
but only two interactive dummies are selected to interact with their corresponding
inflation lags based upon a significant improvement in the fit of the model. We also
employ a constant regime dummy in the mean equation for the cases where doing
so is found to substantially improve the overall statistical performance. In addition,
we account for political circumstances in some countries. For the two exchange rate
targeters, a dummy variable is added to the mean equation to capture the impact
of the Arab Spring on average inflation, in which the dummy is assigned one for the
period from 2011:01 onwards.10 For South Africa, a constant dummy is included
to consider the effect of apartheid on inflation, which takes the value of one for the
period before January 1995, and zero for the months after. Hence, the augmented
mean equations can be represented as follows:
Jordan:
pit = (δ
JO
1 + δ
JO
3 )pit−2 + δ
JO
4 pit−5 + δ
JO
5 pit−9 + (γ
JO
2 + δ
JO
6 )pit−12 + ut (11)
Egypt:
pit = (δ
EG
1 + δ
EG
3 )pit−1 + δ
EG
4 pit−9 + (γ
EG
2 + δ
EG
5 )pit−12 + ut (12)
South Africa:
pit = (δ
SA
1 + δ
SA
3 )pit−1 + δ
SA
4 pit−2 + δ
SA
5 pit− 3 + δSA6 pit−7
+δSA7 pit−8 + δ
SA
8 pit−11 + (δ
SA
2 + δ
SA
9 )pit−12 + ut
(13)
Brazil:
pit = (δ
BR
1 + δ
BR
3 )pit−1 + δ
BR
4 pit−2 + (δ
BR
2 + δ
BR
5 )pit−8 + ut (14)
Poland:
pit = (δ
PO
1 + δ
PO
3 )pit−1 + δ
PO
4 pit−2 + (δ
PO
2
+δPO5 )pit−5 + δ
PO
6 pit−9 + δ
PO
7 pit−11 + ut
(15)
A joint significance of the interactive regime dummies is confirmed by a Wald
test of δ1 = δ2 = 0. For each country, Chi-square statistics reject the hypothesis that
9Inserting S.D in the mean equation is used by Baillie et al. (1996) and Kontonikas (2004).
10The unrest and tensions across the Middle East spread to Jordan and had negative effects
on the economy. For instance, the pipelines that carried gas from Egypt to Jordan were targeted
and bombed several times during the uprising, resulting in oil supply shortage. As a consequence,
Jordan was forced to deal with Israel to import Gas, as Israel has become a major gas exporter in
the region. However, the pace to deal with Israel triggered more domestic opposition and increased
the external debt; see the Daily Mail on 11th December 2014 for more details. The Arab Spring
countries are still, at the time of writing this, being affected by the adverse consequences of the
social unrest.
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the dummies are zero at 1% level of significance, as shown in the last row of Tables 8
to 14. The effect of the monetary regime on inflation inertia is reflected by the sum
of the coefficients of the regime interactive dummy and that of their corresponding
lags. A negative slope dummy indicates that inflation persistence has declined after
adopting the examined regime.11 The results, reported in Tables 8 to 14, imply
that IT has been successful at reducing inflation persistence at a high lag order, as
the coefficients of the second interactive dummies, i.e., δ2, appear with a negative
sign.12 This, however, does not apply to Poland, where all the slope dummies are
non-negative, but its regime constant dummy, Dt, plugged in the mean equation,
shows that the mean of inflation was reduced by IT; this also applies to all the
ITers in the sample.13 For South Africa, the years of apartheid were associated with
higher average inflation, as the constant dummy, APART, presented in Table 12, is
significantly positive under all GARCH models. For Egypt and Jordan, the Arab
Spring dummy is found insignificant as a constant, but its slope, POL, reported
in Tables 8 and 10, has a positive and significant influence on the trend at 1%.14
Unlike the ITers, the inflation mean of the FER targeters is not affected by the fixed
exchange rate regime. The dummy appears insignificant for Jordan and positive
for Egypt. Nonetheless, the FER system appears to be influential in lowering the
inflation inertia in Egypt and Jordan at the first inflation lag.
The parameter estimates of the inflation uncertainty proxy, incorporated in the
mean equation, have a significantly positive sign for all the countries, indicating that
inflation uncertainty increases inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, we
find support for the F-B hypothesis; inflation does generate inflation uncertainty, ir-
respective of the regime followed. Remarkably, the coefficient of the inflation regime
slope dummy, λ1, employed in the variance equation, is significant and negative in
all the respective countries; however, the magnitude of the effect is almost negligible
for Egypt.15 Nevertheless, the significance proves that both regimes could to a cer-
tain extent reduce inflation uncertainty, albeit not directly via decreasing the mean
of inflation for FER targeters.
The results of asymmetric responses to increasing or falling in inflation are not
the expected ones for all the cases. For Jordan, the results imply that both negative
and positive inflation shocks have the same influence on inflation uncertainty. The
positive and significant β2 for Egypt, presented in the second column, EGARCH, of
Table 10, indicates that positive shocks trigger more conditional inflation uncertainty
than negative shocks. Similarly, for Brazil, the asymmetric coefficient, presented in
11Note that, as stated by Kontonikas (2004), the effect of inflation regime on the inflation
persistence is preferred to be analysed in the context of the Kalman filter.
12A large number of literature has pointed out that IT helps countries with their disinflationary
efforts, stabilises inflationary expectations and enhances the monetary authority’s accountability
and transparency, see for example Batini et al. (2007), Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia (2010),
Neumann and Von Hagen (2002), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Hu (2003), Walsh (2009), Batini
et al. (2007).
13We did not report the results with a constant dummy for the other ITers as the results were
found to be better off, in terms of diagnostics, without adding the regime constant. However,
the constant dummy appeared with a negative sign for all the IT cases. We also attempted to
incorporate the regime dummy variable in the variance equations, but the dummy was insignificant
for all the cases.
14Note that the ARCH effect exists in the estimated EGARCH-M model for Egypt, indicating
that the model is not well specified. In general, for both countries, all GARCH-M models showed
better results when the POL-slope dummy and the regime constant dummy were dropped from
the mean equation, see Table 8 and 10.
15Note that this ignores the models estimated for Egypt and Jordan with slope political dummy
and regime constant dummy.
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Tables 13, suggests that inflation uncertainty increases following a positive inflation
shock. However, no asymmetry is found for the two other ITers, implying that
inflation uncertainty process is not influenced by the direction of inflation shocks.
Interestingly, the slope regime dummy, λ1, incorporated in the mean equation, re-
mains negative for all the countries after controlling for asymmetries. Even when
CGARCH-M is used in modelling the inflation variance, the slope dummy has a
significantly negative sign for all the countries, except for South Africa, where the
dummy turns insignificant. This finding suggests that FER system and IT alike are
effective in reducing inflation uncertainty in the long run. Generally, the inflation
trend of the ITers approaches the mean quicker than that of the FER targeting
countries. The power of the short-run component of inflation uncertainty is also
higher in the FER targeters. The diagnostic statistics, reported below each esti-
mated GARCH model, from Table 8 to Table 14, indicate that the GARCH models
are well-specified. The 1st and 12th lag order of Ljung-Box and the 12th lag squared
residuals as well as the LM test for ARCH suggest neither remaining autocorrelation
nor a non-constant variance for all the countries, except for Poland, where ARCH
effect remains in the error terms.16
The findings of a positive bi-directional relationship between inflation and infla-
tion uncertainty suggest the need for a monetary anchor to reduce both inflation
and inflation uncertainty. In general, inflation targeting countries enjoy lower av-
erage inflation and inflation persistence compared to the time before adopting IT
and to the countries with FER regime. The two monetary regimes appear effective
in reducing inflation uncertainty, even under the presence of asymmetries in some
cases, like Brazil and Egypt. The effect also remains in the long run, except for
South Africa.
For FER countries, the benefits of the regime are not reflected in lower average
inflation and inflation inertia and a stable volatility. The constant regime dummy
variable, incorporated in the mean equation, is found to be insignificant for Jordan
and positive for Egypt, and although the FER system appears effective in reducing
uncertain inflation, the magnitude of the regime dummy coefficient is close to zero
for Egypt. It could be argued that anchoring the exchange rate could still influence
inflation uncertainty as long as the possibility to renege on FER commitment is not
perceived by the market. The several depreciations in the Egyptian Pound affected
the mechanism of the FER system and its credibility in the market. The weak
economic institutions and dependency on political authority due to the absence of
mutual and clear vision between the central bank and government might hamper
the role of FER as a device for decreasing inflation and inflation uncertainty. It
could be argued that providing the market with a quantitative target for the price
stability objective would not be optimal if it were not accompanied with a clear
central bank’s roles and objectives, the features which distinguish IT framework.
The results provide evidence, represented by lower inflation and inflation per-
sistence for inflation targeting countries, that the framework which has a direct
quantitative target of inflation could be a better signalling device than the soft peg.
The institutional features which accompany adopting IT might uphold the economy
to move from high inflation to low inflation levels, as the credibility of the system,
and thereby the policy outcome, hinges upon the development of monetary consti-
tutions and transparent policies. The differences in such institutional arrangements
16Poland adopted different monetary regimes during the 1990s. Moreover, Cuestas et al. (2016)
find that the Polish inflation rates are co-moved with that of the Euro Zone. When the sample is
splitted to cover the time after IT, all GARCH models exhibit no remaining ARCH effect.
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might explain why the advantages of the monetary framework differ across countries.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty
under two monetary regimes with a nominal price level target: inflation targeting
and a soft fixed exchange rate regime. Given the important monetary implications of
the nexus between inflation-inflation uncertainty, a large number of studies have been
carried out to examine whether inflation causes inflation uncertainty, as suggested
by Friedman (1977) or inflation uncertainty leads to higher inflation as stated by
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). However, few studies have shed light on the plausible
influence of each regime on reducing inflation uncertainty. This study is carried out
to fill the gap in the literature by empirically assessing the validity of the Friedman
and Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses under the two regimes and examining the effect
of monetary regimes on the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
In particular, it aims to investigate the impact of quantitative targets of monetary
policy upon reducing inflation uncertainty. To do this, we utilise the monthly CPI
data collected from the IMF-IFS database of two fixed exchange rate targeters:
Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeting countries: South Africa, Brazil and
Poland, over the span 01:1980-06:2014.
In order to examine the two hypotheses simultaneously, we apply GARCH-M
model, which allows the inflation rate to be determined by the conditional variance.
We incorporate the standard deviation as a proxy for inflation uncertainty in the
mean equation and augment the variance equation with lagged inflation. Neverthe-
less, as inflation series exhibit positive skewness and leptokurtosis, all the GARCH
models are estimated with the assumption that the errors have a generalised error
distribution. The impact of the regime is assessed by employing a constant and
regimes slope dummy. For each country we start by constructing different ARMA
models. The general to specific approach leads to AR specifications which ensure the
whiteness of the residuals. The regimes dummies are introduced to different lags of
inflation, but only two interactive dummies are selected to be imposed on the mean
equation, based on the improvement in the model fit. Furthermore, we account for
the time of apartheid in South Africa and the political disturbances, due to the Arab
Spring, in Jordan and Egypt. The results from the OLS of the conditional mean
of inflation, run to the time before and after adopting the examined regime, reveal
that inflation targeters, unlike fixed exchange rate countries, have experienced stable
inflation after IT. The “IT regime” constant dummy variable, plugged in the mean
equation, is found significant and negative, reflecting the direct effect of the regime
on lowering the average inflation.17 This is confirmed by the statistics of average
inflation, in which the ITers have enjoyed lower average inflation after shifting to IT.
On the contrary, such desirable effects are not found for exchange rate targeters, as
the regime constant dummy appears significantly positive for Egypt, and insignifi-
cant for Jordan. Political dummies incorporated for the two exchange rate targeters
and South Africa are found to positively affect the inflation trend and the mean.
As the construction of GARCH-M considers only the magnitude of inflation
shocks, we apply asymmetric GARCH-M type model to account for the responses
of the conditional inflation uncertainty to increasing or falling in inflation. More
importantly, the long-run effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty is examined
17The results with a regime constant dummy reported only for the case of Poland.
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by the CGARCH-M, which allows decomposing the short-run from the long-run
component.
The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty appear to be con-
sistent with Friedman and Cukierman-Meltzer hypotheses. The parameter esti-
mates of inflation uncertainty proxy and the one-period lagged inflation, from all
the GARCH-M models and for all the countries, are significantly positive. The
asymmetric GARCH specifications show that inflation affected the process of infla-
tion uncertainty differently in Egypt and Brazil, while for Jordan, South Africa and
Poland, the conditional inflation uncertainty is not influenced by the direction of
inflation shocks.
The impact of the monetary regime on inflation uncertainty is examined by
employing the slope inflation dummy in the conditional variance equation for all
GARCH-M models. A negative and significant parameter indicates that inflation
is reduced across all the countries, irrespective of the monetary regime followed by
the central bank. The negative effect holds even when we account for asymmetries;
the slope dummy remains with a negative sign. Nevertheless, the influence of the
regime is not clear for Egypt, as the coefficient appears with weak magnitude. This
could be due to the instability of the soft exchange rate regime in Egypt during the
analysed period.18
The negative estimates of the slope dummy under the CGARCH-M reflects the
ability of both regimes to reduce inflation uncertainty in the long-run; however, this
effect is found to be insignificant for South Africa. It is also noted that the inflation
trend of fixed exchange rate targeters converges to the mean slower that that of the
ITers.
In general, the paper has made a way towards enhancing the understanding of
the effectiveness of announcing an explicit quantitative target on inflation uncer-
tainty. Furthermore, the positive relationship found between inflation and inflation
uncertainty in both directions underlines that a monetary regime with an ultimate
goal of price stability is a necessity to keep inflation and inflation uncertainty con-
strained. Our findings add to the growing body of literature on the importance of
inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy. IT, according to our results,
appears effective in lowering the inflation persistence and inflation uncertainty more
than the soft fixed exchange rate regime. However, it is shown that ITers have not
equally benefited from IT. One possible explanation for this might be attributed to
the institutional differences among countries in terms of the level of central bank
independence and transparency.19
18 Exchange rate devaluations occurred between 1991 and 1992. In 2001, the government an-
nounced a new parity to the US dollar and shifted gradually to a crawling peg system then the
central bank abandoned the fixed system in January 2003.
19Note that countries under the fixed exchange rate lose monetary freedom, as they have to
keep their monetary policies in tune with the base country, but they can still ensure institutional
independence from the political authority.
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Table 1: : Inflation Properties
Jordan South Africa Egypt Brazil Poland
Panel (a)
Average 2.12 3.88 4.6 33.95 4.44
Maximum 37.65 18.81 51.51 361.23 46.78
Minimum -34.65 -3.87 -36.16 -2.66 -7.68
Average-New Anchor 3.43 1.83 4.92 2.77 2.32
Average-Before 2.62 4.91 3.96 58.04 6.25
Panel (b)
Skewness 0.65 0.78 0.95 2.45 2.75
Kurtosis 9.22 4.57 9.575 10.31 15.59
ARCH effect 8.20*** 23.01*** 76.12*** 27.36*** 19.56***
Breusch-Godfrey LM 1.86 3.8 0.53 1.27 4.81
Jarque-Bera 1385.88 331.09 2226.67 7703.5 942.89
Note: Average-New anchor represents the average of inflation for each country
for the adoption period of the monetary regime under investigation. Average-
Before shows the average before adopting the examined regime. However, since
Egypt opted out of the pegged exchange rate regime in January 2003, the average
of the new anchor reflects the average during the exchange rate targeting, and
hence, the Average-Before is the average after abandoning the fixed exchange
rate system. Brazil was subject to hyperinflation during 1980s until March 1994
owning to the default related fear of the international government debt, see Gar-
cia (1996) for more details. The statistics reported under the Breusch-Godfrey
LM test shows the Obs*R-squared statistics with a chi-squared distribution. The
null hypothesis of the test is that there is no autocorrelation up to lag order ’p’.
ARCH effect test is a Lagrange multiplier test, by Engle (1982), in which the
null hypothesis indicates homoskedasticity.
Table 2: : Unit Root Tests
ADF ADF PP PP
con. con./trend con. con./trend
Jordan -12.05*** -12.07*** -19.02*** -19.01***
South Africa -5.75*** -10.16*** -15.71*** -17.41***
Egypt -24.35*** -24.94*** -23.88*** -24.55***
Brazil -3.97*** -4.64*** -6.13*** -7.59***
Poland -3.52*** -3.91** -14.21*** -14.94***
Note: In the ADF test, the lag length is determined by Schwartz information
criterion, while for the Phillips and Perron test, the default Bartlett Kernel and
Newy-West bandwidth are used. The asterisks ***, **, * denote rejection of the
null hypothesis, i.e., inflation has a unit root for the ADF and PP tests, at 1%,
5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 3: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Jordan 6
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1995:09 1995:10-2014:06
γJO0 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
γJO2 0.117** 0.154** 0.002
γJO5 0.173*** 0.259*** -0.031
γJO9 0.099** 0.125* 0.019
γJO12 -0.100** -0.082 -0.174***
ARCH(1) 8.20*** 5.68** 0.218
ARCH(2) 17.36*** 13.70*** 0.217
ARCH(12) 26.66*** 20.25* 21.13**
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th
lag, respectively.
Table 4: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Egypt 7
full sample during-target opting out
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-2002:12 2003:01-2014:06
γEG0 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007***
γEG1 -0.155*** -0.199*** 0.380***
γEG9 0.124*** 0.142** -0.098
γEG12 -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.084
ARCH(1) 65.02*** 38.68*** 0.162
ARCH(2) 71.46*** 42.85*** 0.249
ARCH(12) 104.90*** 62.33*** 8.85
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th
lag, respectively.
Table 5: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for South Africa 8
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-2000:01 2000:02-2014:06
γSA0 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004***
γSA1 0.231*** 0.139** 0.397***
γSA2 0.213*** 0.228*** 0.048
γSA3 0.134*** 0.108* 0.176
γSA7 0.131*** 0.173*** -0.032
γSA8 0.100*** 0.106* 0.07
γSA11 0.106*** 0.114** 0.003
γSA12 -0.124*** -0.089 -0.214***
ARCH(1) 34.47*** 12.82*** 0.27
ARCH(2) 34.90*** 13.16*** 1.77
ARCH(12) 56.67*** 26.60*** 18.12
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th
lag, respectively.
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Table 6: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Brazil 9
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1999:06 1999:07-2014:06
γBR0 0.063** 0.110*** 0.005***
γBR1 0.462*** 0.447*** 0.741***
γBR2 0.367*** 0.358*** -0.062
γBR8 0.085** 0.065 0.035
ARCH(1) 25.58*** 13.08*** 1.29
ARCH(2) 25.69*** 13.13*** 4.36
ARCH(12) 29.16*** 14.63 8.3
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th
lag, respectively.
Table 7: OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Poland 10
full sample pre-target post-target
coefficient 1981:02-2014:06 1981:02-1998:08 1998:09-2014:06
γPO0 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.003***
γPO1 0.218*** 0.181*** 0.294***
γPO2 0.232*** 0.221*** 0.136*
γPO5 0.138*** 0.118* 0.128*
γPO9 0.114** 0.099 0.093
γPO11 0.181*** 0.177*** 0.113
ARCH(1) 19.96*** 8.34*** 0.02
ARCH(2) 20.61*** 9.79*** 0.03
ARCH(12) 36.78*** 18.46 1.4
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th
lag, respectively.
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Table 8: : GARCH-M models for Jordan 11 (with dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -3.97E-04 -3.20E-04
Pol 0.176*** 0.187***
δJO1 -0.148*** -0.125***
δJO2 0.091*** 0.077***
δJO3 0.116*** 0.081***
δJO4 0.061** 0.047**
δJO5 0.036 0.019
δJO6 -0.207*** -0.208***
δ 0.328*** 0.337***
conditional variance
φ 7.47E-06** -1.590***
α1 0.027
β1 0.810*** 0.127
β2 0.142
λ0 0.003*** 19.19
λ1 -0.002*** -25.67***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=2.15 Q(1)=1.27
Q(12)=13.22 Q(12)=13.70
Q2(12)=14.05 Q2(4)=13.94
TR2(12)=14.6 TR2(12)=14.28
Wald test 20.7***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Dt is the constant-monetary regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy
variable. Pol is the slope dummy that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on
average inflation. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime
dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 9: : GARCH-M models for Jordan 11 (without dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
δJO1 -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.139***
δJO2 0.063* 0.026 0.051
δJO3 0.095** 0.085*** 0.117***
δJO4 0.059** 0.113*** 0.063**
δJO5 0.058** 0.045*** 0.044*
δJO6 -0.194*** -0.153*** -0.179***
δ 0.361*** 0.341*** 0.338***
conditional variance
φ 7.95E-06** -2.493** 4.74E-05
α1 0.034 0.005
β1 0.785*** 0.121 0.764
β2 0.052
λ0 0.003*** 28.851* 0.003***
λ1 -0.002** -24.709* -0.003**
τ
µ 0.025
ρ 0.823***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=2.21 Q(1)=2.34 Q(1)=2.27
Q(12)=12.23 Q(12)=17.85 Q(12)=13.01
Q2(12)=14.71 Q2(12)=21.18 Q2(12)15.26
TR2(12)=15.22 TR2(12)=21.05 TR2(12)=15.82
Wald test 10.58***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 =
λ2 = 0.
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Table 10: : GARCH-M models for Egypt 12 (with dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt 0.002*** 0.0003*
Pol 0.999*** 0.999***
δEG1 -0.223*** -0.131***
δEG2 -0.008 -0.137***
δEG3 0.151*** -0.008***
δEG4 -0.033 -0.001***
δEG5 -0.083 0.002***
δ 0.621*** 0.679***
conditional variance
φ 9.29E-09 0.170***
α1 0.399***
β1 0.664*** 0.265***
β2 0.956***
λ0 3.65E-06 -59.505***
λ1 4.43E-04* 30.83***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=3.29 Q(1)=2.78
Q(12)=40.10 Q(12)=14.54
Q2(12)=4.43 Q2(12)=24.69
TR2(12)=4.16 TR2(12)=26.19**
Wald test 16.39***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Dt is the constant-monetary regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy
variable. Pol is the slope dummy that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on
average inflation. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime
dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 11: : GARCH-M models for Egypt 12 (without dummies)
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
δEG1 -0.282*** -0.263*** -0.161**
δEG2 -0.068 -0.047 -0.034
δEG3 0.189*** 0.204*** 0.138***
δEG4 -0.105*** -0.071** -0.05
δEG5 -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.151***
δEG 0.986*** 0.987*** 0.984***
conditional variance
φ 3.18E-07 -0.062 9.88E-05**
α1 0.091*** 0.149***
β1 0.892*** 0.244*** 0.276
β2 0.100***
λ0 0.0003** -5.647* 2.45E-05
λ1 -0.0004*** -1.545 -0.0004***
τ
µ 0.032***
ρ 0.991***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.0004 Q(1)=0.544 Q(1)=0.18
Q(12)=5.91 Q(12)=5.604 Q(12)=5.71
Q2(12)=20.35 Q2(12)=14.74 Q2(12)=12.94
TR2(12)=18.44 TR2(12)=13.48 TR2(12)=12.53
Wald test 10.39***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 =
λ2 = 0.
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Table 12: : GARCH-M models for South Africa 13
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
δSA1 0.305*** 0.348*** 0.300***
δSA2 -0.112* -0.104 -0.107*
δSA3 0.042 0.003 0.032
δSA4 0.131** 0.165*** 0.135**
δSA5 0.129*** 0.159*** 0.115***
δSA6 0.001 -0.009 0.005
δSA7 0.077** 0.064* 0.079**
δSA8 0.037 0.03 0.036
δSA9 -0.166*** -0.147*** -0.160***
δ 1.557*** 1.467*** 1.546***
conditional variance
φ 5.89E-6** -7.736** 7.14E-06
α1 0.038 0.001***
β1 0.135 0.034 -0.001***
β2 0.158
λ0 0.001*** 31.769 -0.073
λ1 -0.001** -70.414** -0.131
τ
µ 0.028**
ρ 0.870***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=1.02 Q(1)=1.25 Q(1)=1.27
Q(12)=13.00 Q(12)=15.21 Q(12)=14.06
Q2(12)=25.96 Q2(4)=20.27 Q2(12)=25.53
TR2(12)=21.50 TR2(12)=18.87* TR2(12)=21.16*
Wald test 10.82***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
APART is a constant dummy variable capturing the effect of apartheid on av-
erage inflation. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime
dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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Table 13: : GARCH-M models for Brazil 14
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003***
δBR1 0.223*** 0.848*** 0.227***-
δBR2 -0.294*** -0.228*** -0.031***
δBR3 0.532*** 0.344*** 0.777***
δBR4 0.321*** 0.228*** -0.192***
δBR5 0.069*** 0.093*** -0.042***
δ 0.063*** 0.456*** 0.464***
conditional variance
φ 0.006*** 5.321*** 0.004***
α1 6.861*** 0.174***
β1 0.142*** -0.041 0.167***
β2 0.225***
λ0 0.256*** 9.919*** 0.054***
λ1 -0.427*** -100.193*** -0.080***
τ
µ 0.169***
ρ 0.812***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.593 Q(1)=6.18 Q(1)=1.577
Q(12)=13.267 Q(12)=46.93 Q(12)=202.72
Q2(12)=0.453 Q2(12)=0.135 Q2(12)=1.72
TR2(12)=0.432 TR2(12)=1.51 TR2(12)=1.65
Wald test 1163.90***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 =
λ2 = 0. The sum of α1 and β1 in the conditional variance is larger than one.
This is because Brazil was subject to hyperinflation during 1980s to March 1994.
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Table 14: : GARCH-M models for Poland 15
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -0.001* -0.004***
δPO1 0.141* 0.272*** 0.142*
δPO2 0.185*** 0.264*** 0.192***
δPO3 0.182*** 0.114** 0.054
δPO4 0.001 -7.51E-05 0.026
δPO5 -0.012 -0.061** -0.12
δPO6 0.072*** 0.064** 0.068
δPO7 0.071** 0.081*** 0.133***
δ 1.439*** 1.690*** 1.722***
conditional variance
φ 2.14E-06** -3.227*** 6.15E-06***
α1 0.024 0.047***
β1 0.693*** 0.035 0.004
β2 0.017
λ0 0.001*** 29.109*** 0.001***
λ1 -0.001*** -19.046** -0.001***
τ
µ 0.052***
ρ 0.562***
diagnostic statistics
Q(1)=0.01 Q(1)=0.002 Q(1)=13.15
Q(12)=9.38 Q(12)=2.89 Q(12)=60.50
Q2(12)=27.85 Q2(12)=59.30 Q2(12)=69.59
TR2(12)=26.21*** TR2(12)=53.59*** TR2(12)=56.38***
Wald test 12.46***
Note: δ tests the validity of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) hypothesis, where
a positive δ indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation. λ0 is the
one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of Friedman (1977)-Ball (1992)
hypothesis, where a positive λ0 means that inflation raises inflation uncertainty.
Dt is the monetary regime-constant dummy variable. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 0.
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